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Abstract
This paper considers the existence of multiple price equilibrium
(price dispersion) in a customer market with perfect information and
homogeneous agents. We introduce the congestion effect as an ex-
pected utility instead of waiting cost. There exists a continuum of
asymmetric Nash equilibria, that is, any kind of price dispersion exists
in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Numerous studies have been made regarding the existence of price disper-
sion (see Stiglitz 1989 and chapter 16 in Shy 1995 for discussions of various
price dispersion theories$)^{1}$ . Since the seminal paper of Stigler (1961), most
of these models assume a lack of information concerning the prices offered
by firms. Consumers learn the price of a firm either through search (e.g.,
Salop and Stiglitz 1977; Stiglitz 1979; Carlson and McAfee 1983; Burdett
and Judd 1983) or through advertisements (e.g., Butters 1977; Bester and
Petrakis 1995). Moreover, the assumption of heterogeneity of either con-
sumers or firms is common in price dispersion models (e.g., Reinganum
1979; Wilde and Schwartz 1979; Rob 1985). In particular, the assumption
of heterogeneous consumers is crucial in models that do not entail the lack
of information $($Luski 1976; Reitman $1991)^{2}$ . Chen and Kong (2004), how-
There axe several price dispersion models of monetary economies through the random
matching process, see Kamiya and Sato 2003 and the references therein.




ever, demonstrate that price dispersion is possible even in a world of perfect
information and identical consumers and firms. The driving force in their
model is service capacity cost and congestion cost. The congestion cost in
their model can be interpreted as waiting cost (see Luski 1976; Reitman
1991).
The purpose of this paper is to provide another source of price dispersion.
We adopt a model that is a variation of Chen and Kong (2004). Like Chen
and Kong, both firms and consumers are $ex$ ante identical and there are no
search costs and no advertisement costs in our model, that is, all consumers
know the exact prices charged by firms. Unlike their model, however, we
introduce expected utility instead of waiting cost as a congestion effect. The
uncertainty arises fiiom the scarcity of the good sold at low prices. Imagine
the bargain sales at some stores; if there are lots of consumers, some of them
cannot purchase the good at a low price. It is natural to suppose that the
consumer $ex$ ante expects the probability of purchase at a low price as the
relative quantity to the number of customers at the store. In other words,
we assume that consumers take into account not only the prices but also the
supply of goods.
In section 2, we present an oligopolistic market model in which firms
face both price and quantity competition simultaneously. In section 3, the
existence of multiple price equilibria is proved. In section 4, we show that
the degree of price dispersion varies with the number of firms. In section 5,
we modify the model by introducing a cost function. Fixed costs determine
the number of firms and hence the degree of price dispersion. In section 6,
we conclude the paper.
2 The Model
Consider an oligopolistic retail market in which there are two $ex$ ante iden-
tical firms (or discount stores) and $N$ identical consumers $(N>0)$ . There is
an indivisible good. Identical consumers have common preferences defined
by
$u(x,y-p)=ax+y$ -px
where $x\in\{0,1\}$ , $y>0,$ and $a>0$ denote consumption of the good, income,
and the reservation utility, respectively. The term $(y-p)$ represents the
residual income when the consumer purchases the good. Each consumer
purchases at most one unit of the good if the price is equal to or less than
reservation utility $a>0.$ Each firm $i(i=1,2)$ sells the good to his customers
$n_{i}$ at zero cost. The good is sold at high price $p_{h}$ as a list price or a
regular price which is a manufacturer’s suggested retail price. For simplicity,
suppose that the high price level equals the reservation utility. Suppose that
each firm sells the good at a low price $p_{li}\in[0,p_{h})$ with a limited quantity
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$s_{i}\in(0, N]$ . The low price can be interpreted as a bargain price or a sale
price in order to obtain customers from its rival store. We assume that each
firm restricts himself to the quantity $s_{i}$ less than or equal to the number
of customers at both firms (i.e., $s_{i}\leq \mathit{7}\mathit{7}i$ , $i=1,2$ ) in order to avoid the
Bertrand competition and the outcome with zero profit3.
ASSUMPTION 1 each firm takes $p_{h}$ as given and $p_{h}=a>0.$
2.1 The firm $i$ ’s demand function
Each consumer chooses one of two stores for purchase of the good. Several
unlucky consumers may purchase the good at a high price since the high-
price equals the reservation utility level based on Assumption 1. Taking price
and quantity vector $(p_{h},p_{l1},p_{l2}, s_{1}, s_{2})$ as givens, the consumers rationally
expect the number of the customers in each store. The consumer’s expected
utility function $V$ from purchase of the good is defined by:
$V(p_{h},p_{li}, s_{i})= \frac{s_{i}}{n_{i}}(a+y-p_{li})+(1-\frac{s_{i}}{n_{i}})(a+y-p_{h})$, (1)
where $y>0$ is income, and $a>0$ is the reservation utility. The term $(y-p)$
represents the residual income when he purchases the good.
The number of customers at each store changes as long as there is the
chance to obtain the larger surplus. Then $n_{i}$ is determined at which the
expected utility from each store is indifferent, that is,
$V(p_{h}, p_{l1} , s_{1})=V(p_{h},p_{l}2, s_{2})$ ; (2)
hence, ffom (1), we obtain,
$\frac{s_{1}}{n_{1}}(p_{h}-p_{l1})=\frac{s_{2}}{n_{2}}(p_{h}-p_{l2})$. (3)
Using $7\mathrm{A}$ ) $+n_{2}=N,$ we can rewrite (3) as,
$n_{i}(p_{h},p_{li},p_{lj}, s_{i}, s_{j})=N( \frac{(p_{h}-p_{li})s_{i}}{(p_{h}-p_{li})s_{i}+(p_{h}-p_{lj})s_{j}})$ ,
(4)
$=N$ ( $\frac{C_{i}}{C_{1}+C_{2}}$) $i,j=1,2$ , $if$ $j$ ,
where $C_{i}(i=1,2)$ represents the consumer surplus of firm $i$ ’s customers;
that is,
$C_{i}\equiv(p_{h}-pli)si=((a+y-pli) -(a+y-p_{h}))s_{i}$. (5)
$3\mathrm{F}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ a more detailed discussion, see Minagawa and Kawai (2004).
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Equation (4) is the firm $i$ ’s demand function. The firm $i$ can attract con-
sumers by decreasing the low price or increasing the limited quantity; that
is,
$\frac{\partial n_{i}(\cdot)}{\partial p_{li}}<0,$ $\frac{\partial n_{i}(\cdot)}{\partial s_{i}}>0$ , and $\frac{\partial n_{i}(\cdot)}{\partial p\iota j}>0$ , $\frac{\partial n_{i}(\cdot)}{\partial s_{j}}<0,$
for every $pli\in[0,p_{h})$ , $s_{i}\mathrm{E}$ $(0, N]$ . Prom (4), we must notice that the
condition $s_{i}\leq n_{i}(\mathrm{i}=1,2)$ is satisfied if and only if
$(p_{h}-p_{li})(N-s_{i})\geq C_{j}$ $i$ , $j=1,2$ , $i\neq j.$ (6)
This condition can be rewritten $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}^{4}$
$C_{i}+C_{j} \leq\min\{(p_{h}-p_{li})N, (p_{h}-p_{lj})N\}$ . (7)







. $\cdot$ . .
$\cdot$.. $n_{i}(s_{i})$













0 $s_{i}$ $N$ $s_{i}$
Figure 1: An Example of Strategy of $s_{i}$
2.2 TwO-seller Game
Here we solve for an oligopoly equilibrium. We first have to define a price
and quantity competition as a normal-form game. There are two firms as
players of this game. Let each firm’s actions be defined as choosing its low
price and quantity levels taking high price $p_{h}$ as given, and assume that
both firms choose their actions simultaneously. Thus, each firm $i$ chooses
$p_{li}\mathrm{E}$ $[0,p_{h})$ and $s_{i}\in(0, N]$ , $i=1,2$ . The payoff function of each firm $i$ can
be defined by
$\pi i$ $(ph, pli,plj, s_{i}, sj)$ $=Pl\text{\^{i}}$ $i+p_{h}$ ( $n_{i}$ ($p_{h},p_{li},p_{lj}$ , si, $sj$ ) $-si$ ).
$4\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}$ Minagawa and Kawai (2004) for a more detailed discussion of this condition.
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The first term of RHS is the revenue from bargain sales and the second term
is the revenue from regular sales. Assume, for simplicity, that the costs of
production are zero.
Firm $i$ takes $(p_{lj}, s_{j})$ as given and chooses $(p_{li}, s_{i})$ to
$p_{li} \max_{s_{i}},\pi_{i}(\cdot)=p_{li}s_{i}+p_{h}(n_{i}(\cdot)-s_{i})$
$=p_{li}s_{i}+p_{h}( \frac{NC_{i}}{C_{i}+C_{j}}-s_{i})$ (8)
$i_{:}$, $\cdot=1,2$ , $i$ A :..




The second-Order conditions are satisfied since
$\frac{\partial^{2}\pi_{i}}{\partial p_{li}^{2}}=-p_{h}(\cdot)<0,$ and $\frac{\partial^{2}\pi_{i}}{\partial s_{i}^{2}}=-p_{h}(\cdot)<0.$
for every $p_{li}\in$ [Q,Ph) and $s_{i}\in(0,$ $N$] $(i=1,2)$ .






$s_{i}= \frac{\sqrt Np_{h}(p_{h}-p_{lj})s_{j}-(p_{h}-p_{lj})s_{j}}{p_{h}-p_{li}}$ . (12)
Substituting (12) into (11), we find that the solution to this problem is
$indeterminate^{5}$ . We can, however derive the condition of symmetric Nash
equilibrium by substituting $s_{i}=s_{j}=s^{*}$ and $pli=p_{lj}=p_{l}^{*}$ for (11) and
(12). In this process, we obtain (see Figure 2):


















0 $p_{l}^{*}$ $p_{h}$ $p_{l2}$ 0 $s^{*}$ $N$ 92
Figure 2: An Example of Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
Therefore, a set of a price and a quantity levels that satisfies (11) or (12) is
$p_{li}=p \iota_{j}=p_{l}^{*}=(1-\frac{N}{4s^{*}})p_{h}$ and $s_{i}=s_{j}=s^{*}= \frac{p_{h}N}{4(p_{h}-p_{l}^{*})}$ . (15)
Notice that, in equilibrium, the number of customers in each firm become
$n_{i}^{*}=n^{*}=N \int 2.$ From Assumption 1, $s^{*}$ must satisfy $s^{*}\leq$ N/2 and hence,
ffom (15), $p_{l}^{*}$ must satisfy $p_{l}^{*}\leq p_{h}/2$ . The low price level, on the other
hand, should be nonnegative (i.e., $p_{l}^{*}\geq 0$ ), thus the quantity is bounded




$=p_{h}$ ( $1-$ N/4s)
0 $\mathrm{L}_{4}^{\underline{N}}h$ $2k^{\underline{N}}2$ $N$ $s$
Figure 3: A Continuum of Symmetric Nash Equilibria (CSNE)
From the above discussions, we can establish the following proposition.
$5\mathrm{W}\mathrm{e}$ will explain the reason for this in the next section.
125
PROPOSITION 2.1 There exists a continuum of symmetric Nash equi-
libria in which the good is sold at high price $\mathrm{P}h$ and low price $p_{l}^{*}$ . Any set of
$pli=p_{l}^{*}\in[0,p_{h}/2]$ and $s_{i}=s^{*}\in$ [JV/4, $N \oint 2$] for $i=1,2$ which satisfies
$(p_{h}-p_{l}^{*})s^{*}= \frac{p_{h}N}{4}$
is an equilibrium. The number of customers and the profit offirm $i$ are $N/2$
and $p_{h}$N/4, respectively, in all equilibria.
Figure 3 illustrates a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria in Proposi-
tion 2.1.
3 Existence of Multiple Price Equilibria
3.1 TwO-seller Game and TwO-price Equilibria
Proposition 2.1 shows that there exists a continuum of symmetric Nash
equilibria. In this section, we will show that a continuum of asymmetric
Nash equilibria do exist in which there are price dispersions among low





$=p_{h}N( \frac{C_{i}}{C_{i}+C_{j}})-C_{i}$ , $i,j=1,2$ , $if$’ $j$ ,
where $C_{i}$ is the consumers’ surplus at firm $i$ , which is defined by (5). This
payoff function implies that the firm $i$ gives away the surplus to consumers
in order to obtain his customer ffom the rival store. This is the reason for
the indeterminacy in (11) and (12). The set of strategies $(p_{li}, s_{i})$ is reduced
to the unique strategy variable $C_{i}(\in(0,p_{h}N])$ .
The first-Order condition of this problem is
$\frac{\partial\pi_{i}}{\partial C_{i}}=p_{h}N$ $( \frac{C_{j}}{(C_{i}+C_{j})^{2}})-1=0.$
The second-Order condition is satisfied since
$\frac{\partial^{2}\pi_{i}}{\partial C_{i}^{2}}=-p_{h}(\frac{C_{j}}{(C_{i}+C_{j})^{3}})<0$
for every $C_{i}\in(0,p_{h}N]$ . Hence, the best-response function of firm $i$ as a
function of the consumer surplus level of firm $j$ is given by
$C_{i}=R_{i}(C_{j})=\sqrt{p_{h}NC_{j}}-C_{j}$ . (17)
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The solution of this game $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}^{6}$




0 $C^{*}=\mathrm{H}h^{\underline{N}}4$ $p_{h}N$ $C_{2}$
Figure 4: The Best-Response Functions
The original game’s strategy is the set of $p_{li}$ and $s_{i}$ . We find that any
set of $p_{li}$ and $s_{i}$ which satisfy (19) is a Nash equilibrium. In other words,
there is a continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria in the original game.
Rom the above discussions, we have established the following proposi-
tion.
PROPOSITION 3.1 There exists a continuum of asymmetric Nash equi-
libria in which the good is sold at one high price $p_{h}$ and ttwo low prices
$(p_{l1}^{*},p_{l2}^{*})$ . Any set of $p_{li}=p_{li}^{*}\in[0,p_{h}/2]$ and $s_{i}=s_{i}^{*}\in$ [7V/4, $\mathrm{J}\mathrm{V}/2$ ], $i=1,2$,
which satisfies
$C’=(p_{h}-p_{li}^{*})s_{i}^{*}= \frac{p_{h}N}{4}$ , $i=1,2$ .
is an equilibrium. The number of customers and the profit offirm $i$ are $N/2$
and $p_{h}N/4$ , respectively, in all equilibria.
Notice that the symmetric Nash equilibria in Proposition 2.1 is included
in the equilibria in Proposition 3.1. Figure 5 illustrates an example of the
best response correspondence of firm 1 when firm 2 adapts a set of equilib-
rium strategies $(p_{l2}^{*}, s_{2}^{*})$ .









0 $4N$ $2N$ $N$ $s_{1}0$ $s_{2}^{*}$ $2N$ $N$ $s_{2}$
Figure 5: A Continuum of Asymmetric Nash Equilibria
3.2 $M$-seller Game and $M$-price Equilibria
Suppose now that the market consists of $M(\geq 1)$ identical firms. We found
that, in the twO-seller game, the firm’s strategy is represented by choosing
the consumer surplus level, instead of choosing price and quantity levels
independently. In the $\mathrm{M}$-seller game, we need to deduce the firm $i$ ’s demand
function as a function of the consumer surplus levels of all firms. Then (3)
can be modified by
$\frac{C_{i}}{n_{i}}=\frac{C_{j}}{n_{j}}$ , $i$ , $j=1,2$ , $\ldots$ , $M$, $j\neq j.$ (20)
This condition means that the average consumer surplus per capita at the
store must be equal among the stores in equilibrium. Although there are
$M$ equations in (20), one of them is not independent. Hence, there are
$M-1$ independent equations and $\sum_{i=1}^{M}n,$ $=N.$ Solving these $(M-1)+1$
equations with $M$ unknowns, the firm $i$ ’s demand function can be calculated
as
$n_{i}(C_{i}, C_{-i})=N( \frac{C_{i}}{C_{i}+C_{-i}})$ , where $C_{-i}=. \sum_{4}^{M-1}.C_{j}$ . (21)
The condition (6) can be rewritten as
$(p_{h}-p_{li})N-C_{i}\geq C_{-i}$ , for $i=1,2$ , . . ‘ , $M$,
because the profit of firm $i$ is not continuous at $C_{i}=0$ for $C_{\mathrm{j}}=0.$ That is if $C_{\mathrm{j}}=0,$




Then, the firm $i$ can obtain larger profit by increasing Ci $(>0)$ .
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and hence,
$C_{i}+C_{-i} \leq\min${ ($p_{h}-$ $pn$ ) $N$, $(p_{h}-$ pn)N, . . 1 , $(p_{h}-$ $p_{lM})N$ }. (22)
ASSUMPTION 3 Each firm takes action within the condition (22).
Using this demand function (21), firm $i$ chooses $C_{i}$ to
$\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}c.\cdot\pi_{i}(C_{i}, C_{-i})=p_{h}N(\frac{C_{i}}{C_{i}+C_{-\dot{i}}})-C_{i}$ .
The first order condition is given by
$\frac{\partial\pi_{i}}{\partial C_{i}}=p_{h}N$ ( $\frac{C_{-i}}{(C_{i}+C_{-i})^{2}}$) $-1=0.$
Hence, the best-response function of firm $i$ as a function of the consumer
surplus levels of firm $-i$ is given by
$C_{i}=R_{i}(C_{-i})=\sqrt{p_{h}NC_{-i}}-C_{-i}$ . (23)
Since all firms are identical regarding cost structure, we can find that
the solution where $C_{i}=C$’ for all $i=1$ , $\ldots$ , $M$ . Substituting the common
$C^{*}$ into the already derived best-response functions. We have it that
$C’=\sqrt{p_{h}N(M-1)C^{*}}-$ (Af -1) $C^{*}$ .
Hence, there are two solutions:
$C^{*}=(1- \frac{1}{M})\frac{p_{h}N}{M}$ . (24)
Similar to the discussion of the twO-seller game, $C^{*}=0$ could not be a Nash
equilibrium since if $C_{-i}=0,$ from (18), the firm $i$ has an incentive to deviate
from that state. We now can establish the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3,2 There exists a continuum of asymmetric Nash equi-
libria in which the good is sold at one high price and $M$ low prices $(p_{l1}^{*}, . . | ,p_{lM}^{*})$ .
Any set of
$0 \leq p_{li}^{*}\leq\frac{p_{h}}{M}$ , and $(1- \frac{1}{M})\frac{N}{M}\leq s_{i}^{*}$ , $\frac{N}{M}$ (25)
which satisfies
$C^{*}=(p_{h}-p_{li}^{*})s_{\dot{l}}^{*}=(1- \frac{1}{M})\frac{p_{h}N}{M}$ , $i=1,2$ , . . 1 , $M$.
is an equilibrium. The number of customers of firm $i$ is the same in each
equilibrium, which is $n_{i}^{*}=n^{*}=N \int Mr$ The profit of the firm $i$ is also the
same as
$\pi_{i}^{*}=\pi’=\frac{p_{h}N}{M^{2}}$ , $i=1,2$ , .. 1 , $M$.
in each equilibrium.
Note that each firm does not necessarily set different prices. Thus, there
exists any kind of price distribution in equilibrium.
Eac
ffi











4 Multiple Price Equilibria and Welfare
4.1 Varying the Number of Sellers
We now investigate the changes in the degree of price dispersion among low
price levels as we change the number of firms in the industry. First, note
that substituting $M=1$ into (24) yields $C’=0,$ that is, the firm does not
adopt the discount strategy hence the equilibrium price becomes monopoly
price $p_{h}$ . Second, substituting $M=2$ yields the duopoly solution described
in Proposition 3.1.
Now we let the number of firms grow with no bounds. Then, we have it
that, from (25),
$\lim_{Marrow\infty}p_{li}^{*}=0$ and $\lim_{Marrow\infty}s_{i}^{*}=0.$
The former equation $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}p_{li}^{*}=0$ implies that price dispersions disappear in
the limit. The latter equation $\lim s_{i}^{*}=0$ should be regarded as the firm $i$
selling at a low price within the limit as the number of sales itself converges
to zero; i.e., $\lim n^{*}=0.$ In fact, from (25), the range of the total supply of
the good at a low price is
(1 – $\mathrm{M}$) $N\leq S^{*}<N,$ where $S^{*}= \sum s_{i}^{*}$ .
Hence, the limit of $S^{*}$ is
$\lim_{Marrow\infty}S^{*}=N.$
These equations imply that the multiple price equilibria converge to the
unique competitive price (i.e., $p_{l}=0$) equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 4.1 As the number of firms increases,
1. The multiple price equilibria converge to the unique competitive equi-
librium,
2. The variance of price dispersion decreases.
4.2 Welfare Analysis
We have assumed that the utility function has a special form
$u(1,y-p)=a+y-p,$
where $u(1, y-p)$ denotes the utility function when one unit of the good is
purchased (hence the first factor of this function is 1) at a price $p$ (hence
the second factor of this function is the residual income $y-p$). We can,
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however, generalize it to the risk-neutral class with respect to income. Using
the expression $u(1, y-p)$ , each consumer’s expected utility function from
the store $i$ is rewritten as
$V(p_{h},p_{li}, s_{i})=( \frac{s_{i}}{n_{i}})u(1, y-p_{li})+(1-\frac{s_{i}}{n_{i}}$ ) $u(1, y-p_{h})$ . (26)
From (26), the equal-expected-utility condition $V$ ($p_{h},p_{li},$ si)=V$(ph,plj, sj)$
can be written as
$\frac{s_{i}}{n_{i}}$ $(u(1, y-p_{li})-u(1, y-p_{h}))= \frac{s_{j}}{n_{j}}(u(1, y-p_{lj})-$ u(1, $y$ -Ph). (27)
Since we assume here that the utility function tz is risk neutral (i.e., a linear
function with respect to residual income $y-p$), and $p_{h}$ equals the reservation
utility7, the consumer surplus ffom the purchase of the good at a low price
can be written as
$u(1, y-p_{li})-u(1, y-p_{h})=\gamma(y-p_{li})-\gamma(y-p_{h})$
(28)
$=\gamma(p_{h}-p_{li})$ , $\gamma\geq 1,$





Therefore, there is no need to modify the discussions of the previous sections
even if $\gamma>1.$
From (28), the consumer surplus ffom each firm is $\gamma C^{*}$ . Thus, the
consumer surplus in this market is
$CS^{*}(M)=\gamma M\mathrm{c}$ $C’=\gamma$ [ 1– 9 ) $p_{h}N$.
The producer surplus is aggregate profit,
$PS^{*}(M)=M \pi^{*}(M)=\frac{p_{h}N}{M}$





From the above discussions, we can establish the following proposition.
$\overline{\tau \mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}}$reservation price$ph$ is nowdefined by $p_{h}=\{p|u(1, y-p)=U(0, y)\}$
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PROPOSITION 4.2 The consumer surplus increases and the producer
surplus decreases with respect to M. The social welfare increases if $\gamma>1.$
That is,
If $\gamma>1,$
$\lim_{Marrow\infty}CS^{*}(M)=$ iPhN, $Marrow\infty \mathrm{I}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}PS^{*}(M)=0$
and
$\lim_{Marrow\infty}W^{*}(M)$ $=(1-$ (1 $- \frac{1}{\gamma}$) $\mathrm{H})$ $\gamma p_{h}N=\gamma p_{h}N$.
Notice that if all firms charge the high price, each firm’s profit is $p_{h}N/M$ .
Therefore, this market has the prisoner’s dilemma characteristic as in usual
imperfect competition models.
5 Introducing a Cost Function
In multiple price equilibria, the supremum low price level is at most $p_{h}$ [2.
This is not realistic because we observe that, for example, the good is sold at
75% of its regular price, etc. We can, however, explain this by introducing
a cost function. The cost function is defined by
$K(n_{i})=kn_{i}+A,$
where $k\in$ [0,Ph) and $A>0$ are the marginal costs and fixed costs, respec-
tively. As in Varian (1980), this function is based on the casual observation
that retail stores are characterized by fixed costs of rent and sales force, plus
constant variable costs (the wholesale cost) of the good being sold. Since
the marginal cost is $k$ , it seems natural that the lower bound of the low price
is $k$ (and hence $p_{li}\in[k,$ $p_{h}$ ) and $C_{i}\in(0, (p_{h}-k)N])$ . Formally, the profit
of firm $i$ is
$\pi_{i}=p_{h}n_{i}-C_{i}-K(n_{i})$
$=p_{h}N$ ( $\frac{C_{i}}{C_{i}+C_{-i}}$) $-C_{i}-k$ $(N$ ( $\frac{C_{i}}{C_{i}+C_{-i}}$)) $-A$ .
Substituting the cost function into $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}_{\}}$ the firm $i$ chooses $C_{i}\in(0,$ $(p_{h}-$
$k)N]$ to
$\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}c\dot{.}\pi_{i}$
$(C_{i}, C_{-i})=(p_{h}-k)N( \frac{C_{i}}{C_{i}+C_{-i}})$ $-C_{i}-A$ .
Since the marginal cost and the fixed cost are constant, the same arguments
can be applied to this problem.
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The first order condition is
$(p_{h}-k)N( \frac{C_{-i}}{(C_{i}+C_{-i})^{2}})=1.$
The best response function is
$C_{i}=R(C_{-i})\equiv\sqrt(p_{h}-k)NC_{-i}-C_{-\mathrm{i}}$
Therefore, we can establish the following result.
PROPOSITION 5.1 There exists a continuum. of asymmetric Nash equi-
libria in which the good is sold at one high price and $M$ low prices $(p_{l1}^{*}$ , . . . , $p_{lM}^{*})$ .
Any set of
$k \leq p_{li}^{*}\leq\frac{p_{h}}{M}+(1-\frac{1}{M})k$ , and $(1- \frac{1}{M})\frac{N}{M}\leq s_{i}^{*}\leq$ $\mathrm{u}$ . (29)
which satisfies
$C^{*}=$ ($p_{h}-p_{l}^{*}$s) $s_{i}^{*}=(1- \frac{1}{M})\frac{(p_{h}-k)N}{M}$ , $i=1,2$ , . . ’ $M$.
is an equilibrium. The number of customers of firm $i$ is the same in each
$eq.u$ilibrium, which is $n_{i}^{*}=n^{*}=N[M$ . The profit of the firm $i$ is also the
same as
$\pi_{i}^{*}=\pi^{*}=\frac{(p_{h}-k)N}{M^{2}}-A,$ $i=1,2$ , $\ldots$ , $M$.
in each equilibrium. Furthermore, the number of firms is determined by
$\pi^{*}=0;i.e.$ ,
$M^{*}=\sqrt{\frac{(p_{h}-k)N}{A}}$ . (30)
Note that from (30), fixed cost $A$ determines the number of firms and hence
the degree of price dispersion.
6 Concluding Remarks
We found that price dispersion occurs in an oligopolistic retail market with
perfect information, homogeneous agents, and no cost functions. The key
role of price dispersion is that each firm can choose both price and quantity
levels. This generates consumers’ expectations of congestion. As a result,
the number of customers is determined endogenously in this model. It is
worth noticing that, in a multiple price equilibrium, each different price is
paired with each different quantity. In this sense, the good is discriminated.
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